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Abstract—Symbolic execution has shown its ability to find
security-relevant flaws in software, but faces significant scala-
bility challenges. There is a commonly held belief that manual
intervention by an expert can help alleviate these limiting factors.
However, there has been little formal investigation of this idea.
In this paper, we present our experiences applying the KLEE
symbolic execution engine to a new bug corpus, and of using
manual intervention to alleviate the issues encountered. Our con-
tributions are (1) Hemiptera, a novel corpus of over 130 bugs in
real world software, (2) a comprehensive evaluation of the KLEE
symbolic execution engine on Hemiptera with a categorisation
of frequently occurring software patterns that are problematic for
symbolic execution, and (3) an evaluation of manual mitigations
aimed at addressing the underlying issues of symbolic execution.
Our experience shows that manual intervention can increase both
code coverage and bug detection in many situations. It is not
a silver bullet however, and we discuss its limitations and the
challenges encountered.
I. INTRODUCTION
Symbolic execution is a flexible approach to program
analysis which can be embedded in various approaches to
program analysis. Applications include test case generation [14],
static bug finding [5], patch validation [22], deobfuscation [24]
and exploit generation [7]. However, when applying symbolic
execution on a new application it is common to encounter
significant problems. In this paper we document our experiences
using KLEE to perform bug detection across a diverse set of
programs, and of using manual intervention to alleviate the
issues encountered.
The term symbolic execution refers to analysis systems
with a broad range of capabilities and approaches. In this
paper, we focus on a path-wise forwards analysis that uses
symbolic variables for the inputs from the environment. We
exclude from consideration systems that utilise concrete inputs
in order to produce a trace that is then executed symbolically
(e.g., concolic execution [14]). We also exclude systems that
utilise state merging in order to produce states that represent
multiple paths [2], [18]. The rationale for this focus is that
the majority of maintained open source implementations123 do
not implement either of these features. While state merging
and concolic execution may resolve some issues we discuss, at
the present time, these features are unavailable to a user who
wants to utilise symbolic execution via the existing tools.
1https://klee.github.io
2https://angr.io
3https://github.com/trailofbits/manticore
We furthermore focus on the KLEE symbolic execution
engine [5] in our experimental work. KLEE is a mature,
maintained symbolic execution engine and has served as the
basis for a large number of academic publications4 from a
diverse set of research groups.
Generally, existing approaches that attempt to address the
scalability issues faced by symbolic execution are aligned
in two complementary directions. Firstly, there are automated
solutions, for example state merging [18], [2] and compositional
testing [20]. Secondly, there are manual solutions, such as
the introduction of logical assumptions [29], [30], where a
domain expert assists symbolic execution in order to improve
effectiveness.
While path explosion can be demonstrated with a very simple
program, namely, a loop that contains a branch, detailed case-
studies of problematic patterns that occur in real-world software
are lacking in the literature. Similarly, while many members of
the research community expect that manual intervention can
deal with problematic patterns in the software under test, there
are few experience reports on how feasible this approach is
across diverse applications and how successful, or not, it can
be. We aim to address both of these issues.
To generate a baseline dataset we use KLEE [5] to analyse
a set of real-world applications with the goal of discovering
security-relevant bugs. We document the limiting factors we
observe and categorise the root causes of these issues. To
mitigate the challenges encountered, we employ existing
techniques that require manual intervention, which often involve
trading soundness or completeness for scalability. Exemplars
are the manual insertion of logical constraints, early state
termination and the use of driver programs. Finally, we evaluate
the changes in code coverage and bug detection that result from
these interventions and discuss their successes and limitations.
We view our research as orthogonal to work on automated
solutions to the categories of problems that we describe. An
automated solution that effectively manages one limitation
still often leaves the symbolic execution engine struggling due
to other issues left unaddressed. This hampers adoption of
symbolic methods. Thus, it is necessary to also understand
the outstanding issues that are significant when analysing real
programs, and how these issues can be alleviated via manual
intervention.
4https://klee.github.io/publications/
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To support our research, we have compiled Hemiptera,
a substantial bug suite containing 133 genuine bugs found in
open-source applications. The bugs are individually labelled
with commit IDs identifying a software version they are present
in, and test cases that trigger the bugs are provided. A substan-
tial amount of previous work uses synthetic datasets [28], a
very limited number of real-world programs [17], [31] or real-
world programs where a lower bound for the number of bugs
that should be detectable is not known [2], [5]. Hemiptera is
shared openly with the community to support further research.
A. Contributions
This paper provides three main contributions.
1) Hemiptera, a bug suite containing over 130 genuine
bugs in open-source programs, with test cases, and
labelled with their associated commit IDs.
2) A categorisation of code constructs that pose severe
challenges to symbolic execution via a large-scale inves-
tigation of more than 24 program versions, across eight
programs, using KLEE.
3) An evaluation of the feasibility and effectiveness of
manual intervention in addressing state space explosion
within symbolic execution.
We provide all raw data, scripts and source within the
artefacts5.
B. Organisation of Paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 delves
into Hemiptera, Section 3 presents an evaluation of KLEE
on Hemiptera, Section 4 presents an in-depth exploration
of the challenges encountered by symbolic execution in the
evaluation from Section 3, and the mitigations we employ to
overcome these challenges, Section 5 presents an evaluation of
the success of the mitigations described in Section 4, Section 6
lists potential threats to validity, Section 7 discusses related
work, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
II. THE HEMIPTERA BUG SUITE
Hemiptera6 is a large corpus of patched bugs that have
been present in eight major real-world applications. In total, the
corpus contains 133 bugs, many of which are security relevant
and could be leveraged to gain malicious code execution. The
types of bugs present in Hemiptera include invalid memory
accesses, failed assertions, and division by zero exceptions.
The applications considered are all open-source and written
in C.
While some existing bug suites [19] do consider real-world
applications, they are often limited due to small bug counts.
Meanwhile, others [3], [16], [15] provide a large number of
bugs but are synthetic. For instance, Dolan-Gavitt et al. [12]
have proposed LAVA, a tool capable of automatically injecting
artificial bugs into software. Although such an approach
facilitates the creation of a large bug corpus, it still threatens
5Via GitHub, this link has been removed to anonymise the paper for review
6Our bug suite is named after the order of bugs Hemiptera, meaning
“True Bugs”.
Fig. 1. Methodology of building Hemiptera.
the validity of the claims that might be made about real-world
code when used as the sole evaluation corpus for an analysis.
The DARPA CGC corpus also faces similar issues7, since the
programs are synthetic.
a) Composition.: Table I summarises the composition of
Hemiptera. Several of the bugs contained in Hemiptera
are security relevant, and could have been leveraged to gain
malicious code execution. Where applicable, Hemiptera
provides the CVE ID that is associated with a given bug.
For each bug in the corpus, we recorded the commit ID of
the patch as well as the commit ID of the immediate unfixed
predecessor (the parent ID). The inclusion of every unfixed
version, for each bug, would result in an impractically high
number of application versions to analyse. Consequently, for
each application, Hemiptera provides the minimal set of
commit IDs (referred to as a Min-Set) such that all of the bugs
in the corpus that pertain to an application are present. We
calculated the average line counts of the versions in each Min-
Set. Overall, the corpus considers reasonably large applications,
ranging from 7,835 (zlib) to 56,573 (LibTIFF) lines of C
code.
b) Selection Criteria.: We selected applications for inclu-
sion in Hemiptera based on four major criteria:
1) The applications are similar to those considered suitable
for analysis by state of the art symbolic execution tools.
Examples are file parsers, utility libraries and system
tools.
2) If an application contained bugs, such bugs would be
likely to have security implications.
3) The application’s project must be open-source.
4) The project must have a publicly accessible version
control system (e.g. Git), such that changes to files are
tracked, and we can therefore identify the buggy and
patched versions for each bug.
c) Construction Methodology.: Figure 1 illustrates the
methodology of Hemiptera’s construction. Once an applica-
tion is selected, we run a set of scripts to facilitate the inspection
of change logs. The scripts automatically retrieve the commit
history of the master branch of the application, and select
commits that have messages that contain relevant terms. These
terms include “bug”, “cve”, “zero”, “overflow” and “crash”.
7http://archive.darpa.mil/cybergrandchallenge/tech.html
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF HEMIPTERA’S COMPOSITION.
Project # InvalidAccesses
# Failed
Asserts
# Div
by Zeros
# Dang
Ptr. Use
Size of
Min-Sets
Avg. lines
of C Code
JasPer 11 6 2 0 2 25,891
LibTIFF 36 1 4 0 5 56,573
tcpdump 10 0 0 0 2 47,782
libjpeg-turbo 1 0 1 0 1 25,920
zlib 2 0 0 1 2 7,835
file 5 1 1 0 3 12,597
w3m 44 0 0 2 3 53,338
FLAC 5 0 0 0 1 46,114
Total 114 8 8 3 19 34,506
For all selected commits, the scripts extract their date, hash
ID and parent ID. The process continues with manual analysis,
whereby the resulting commits are inspected to check whether
they are likely to be patches for security relevant bugs. Bugs
that seem to be security irrelevant, such as memory leaks and
syntax errors, or are very platform dependent, are discarded.
The presence of these bugs is then confirmed by searching
for an input which triggers it. Test cases that successfully
trigger the bugs are retrieved by inspecting bug trackers, test
folders, and online repositories, such as Exploit-DB8. Failure
to find a test case that successfully triggers a bug results in
the bug being omitted from the corpus.
The process then takes an incremental approach in order to
derive the Min-Set of the application. It begins by first including
the commit ID of earliest buggy version to the set. We then
run the version against the collected test cases iteratively, in
an order that is sorted by the date of fix of the bugs. In the
event that a test case fails to reproduce its bug, the commit
ID of the version that successfully triggers the bug is included
in the Min-Set. In turn, the version associated with the newly
inserted commit ID is considered for checking the remaining
test cases. This process continues until all bugs are triggered
successfully.
Although the process of building Hemiptera has been par-
tially automated through scripting, it still incurred a significant
amount of manual effort. We believe that dealing with this
challenge is worthwhile to reduce threats to the validity of
our results, as well as contribute a useful bug corpus to the
community.
III. EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF THE ART
To generate a dataset to categorise challenges in real-world
symbolic execution, we ran KLEE on 24 different program
versions, across eight programs, as provided by Hemiptera.
The configuration for KLEE as recommended by its authors9
was used, combined with our own KLEE modifications as
detailed in the next section.
8https://www.exploit-db.com/
9https://klee.github.io/docs/coreutils-experiments/
A. Experiment
We used KLEE version 1.3.0 with two search strategies, cov-
new and random-path10. The covnew state selection algorithm
selects the state it believes to be closest to uncovered code,
while the random-path algorithm selects a state by randomly
traversing the tree of all paths taken by all live states until a
state representing the head of a path is reached.
We also tested a modification for KLEE, which was intro-
duced to resolve an issue we encountered with state selection:
When using the batching searcher, if a conditional branch
based on symbolic data is encountered, where both the taken
and fall-through cases are feasible, KLEE will always schedule
the state corresponding to the branch taken case. On several
targets, this often results in failure to analyse the remaining
code in functions that have a branch towards a return early
in their body. Consequently, we implemented a mechanism
that randomly selects between the two states of a branch, post
forking. We refer to this feature as rspf (random state, post-
fork) in the remainder of this section.
As well as using covnew and random-path together, we also
ran KLEE against each program with only random-path, and
with a combination of covnew, random-path, and rspf. All target
applications were compiled to LLVM bitcode using wllvm11.
Optional third-party libraries were not linked, unless they
were required for a bug found in Hemiptera. As libtiff
comes with a significant number of driver applications, we
focused specifically on tiff2pdf, which triggers the highest
proportion of its bugs. Each run was one hour long, and each
experiment was executed three times to increase reliability. We
ran our experiments on an Intel Xeon X5667 at 3.07 GHz with
24 GB of RAM available to each process.
B. Results
Table II quantifies the effectiveness of KLEE. We present
averages over all runs within the table. The performance
appears to be generally poor, finding very few of the known
bugs in Hemiptera. KLEE failed to find bugs in most
program versions. In general, code coverage appears to be
low in absolute terms, but without any external baseline to
compare against, it is difficult to determine what proportion of
10https://klee.github.io/docs/options/
11https://github.com/travitch/whole-program-llvm
“interesting” code this corresponds to. However, considering
most bugs are not found, it is clear that a substantial amount
of “interesting” code is not reached.
When using covnew combined with random-path, KLEE
found bugs in six different program versions, while rspf
improved bug detection for one program version. By contrast,
random-path finds significantly fewer bugs (a total of six bugs
compared to a total of 109 bugs for covnew + random-path).
However, on some programs (e.g. imginfo, zlib and file),
random-path achieves higher coverage, despite the fact that
covnew has been designed specifically to maximise coverage.
Furthermore, if we exclude tcpdump, then random-path has
nearly equivalent code coverage and bug finding performance
to the coverage-driven runs.
Several bugs found in tcpdump were unknown and present
on the most recent version at the time of conducting our
experiments. Therefore they were not included in Hemiptera,
as the methodology of constructing our corpus requires that
included bugs are patched.
One possible cause why covnew performs worse than
random-path, in certain cases, is covnew’s algorithm for
calculating proximity to uncovered code. This algorithm is
static, path-insensitive and over-approximates the points-to sets
for function pointers. We discovered that covnew frequently
schedules states forked from the same location repeatedly, as
it erroneously believes that a state at that location is close to
uncovered code, and can reach it. KLEE then runs the scheduled
state but, importantly, never succeeds in actually reaching the
code it thought it was close to. The algorithm does not react
to this failure, e.g., by penalising the starting location, and
therefore covnew picks another state from exactly the same
initial location, only to fail again with high likelihood.
One notable observation is KLEE’s vulnerability to code
constructs that are similar to canonical examples of the path
explosion problem. In Figure 2 we can see that a single
program location is often responsible for the majority of
states created across the applications in Hemiptera. Upon
investigation, most of these locations are branches embedded
in a straightforward loop over input.
It is clear that no search strategy is particularly effective on
all programs. On many applications in Hemiptera, KLEE
struggles to find bugs and attain high code coverage. Moreover,
whatever problems KLEE is encountering are sufficiently severe
to diminish the benefit of the coverage-driven search strategies
in all but one application.
IV. CATEGORISATION OF CHALLENGES AND MANUAL
INTERVENTIONS
In this section we present a categorisation of the main issues
KLEE encountered during the analysis of the applications in
Hemiptera, using the dataset generated via the experimental
12An asterisk on the commit number represents that the head version of a
project was considered.
13It is unknown how many bugs exist in the latest version of a program.
14ICov refers to the instruction coverage, which is calculated over all
library code, even if it was unreachable.
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Fig. 2. The percentage of state forks produced by the program location
responsible for most state forks, per application. A single program location
can often be responsible for the consumption of an inordinate amount of the
analysis engine’s resources.
runs outlined in Section III. The categories cover the most
significant issues encountered and we hypothesise that they are
likely to generalise to targets not only in Hemiptera, but
within the realm of applications one might reasonably expect
symbolic execution to be able to analyse.
We also offer mitigations for these issues, based on manual
intervention, where applicable. Manual intervention is often
proposed as a means by which one can alleviate the issues
encountered by symbolic execution. However, there are few
experience reports documenting its effectiveness on benchmarks
like Hemiptera.
To investigate the challenges, we use the following informa-
tion: (1) runtime analysis data as generated by KLEE, from
which we can determine the program locations responsible
for generating forks in the symbolic state and solver queries,
(2) data provided by KLEE’s existing analysis tools, such as
klee-stats and klee-replay, (3) logs of the scheduler’s
decision process15, (4) data on the final location for states still
live at the end of the experiment16, and (5) warnings from
KLEE.
An analysis run is often hindered by a single dominant chal-
lenge. Therefore, we have followed an iterative approach when
introducing our modifications. We run each target for an hour,
analyse the information mentioned above, introduce a small
number of changes, and then repeat the process. We stopped
iteration when there was no longer a clear significant challenge
that we can address using manual intervention.
A. State-Space Explosion of Semantically Similar States
Across all targets, we encountered constructs which resulted
in state space explosion. Often, the path constraints of the
15We extended KLEE’s logging in a number of different ways to allow us
to understand what states were being scheduled and why, as well as what code
they were covering.
16We also added logging of the states which were still alive at the end of
each experiment, in order to determine what locations in the target states were
blocked at.
TABLE II
BUG COUNT AND COVERAGE RESULTS ATTAINED BY KLEE ON REAL-WORLD PROGRAMS. H. Bugs REPRESENTS THE DETECTED BUGS WHICH ARE ALSO
PRESENTED IN HEMIPTERA .
Program Commit12
covnew &
random-path random-path
covnew,
random-path &
rspf
Known
Bugs in
Hemiptera13Bugs H. Bugs ICov14 Bugs H. Bugs ICov Bugs H. Bugs ICov
tcpdump 17a3c288* 32 - 4.94% 0 - 3.14% 28 - 4.23% 0
tcpdump a9e4211 40 1 4.91% 0 0 3.39% 28 2 4.20% 9
tcpdump 8322d3a 31 0 4.61% 0 0 3.14% 23 0 4.40% 1
w3m 1ac245b* 0 - 9.01% 0 - 8.77% 0 - 9.15% 0
w3m 02ba3d6 4 0 8.96% 3 0 8.75% 4 1 9.07% 9
w3m 06caca1 0 0 8.90% 0 0 8.74% 0 0 9.01% 15
w3m a56a8ef 0 0 8.96% 0 0 8.75% 0 0 9.06% 11
libjpeg-turbo a0b7de9* 0 - 23.10% 0 - 22.72% 0 - 20.61% 0
libjpeg-turbo 3091354 1 0 15.01% 1 0 14.98% 1 0 15.38% 2
imginfo 4212e7e* 0 - 10.36% 0 - 14.68% 0 - 9.93% 0
imginfo b702259 1 1 10.39% 2 1 12.41% 1 1 11.08% 18
jasper 4212e7e* 0 - 12.96% 0 - 13.26% 0 - 13.93% 0
jasper ed355a6 0 0 13.47% 0 0 13.75% 0 0 12.04% 2
file df74b09* 0 - 12.61% 0 - 12.75% 0 - 8.82% 0
file b6e8437 0 0 13.83% 0 0 13.90% 0 0 13.94% 6
file 4a51454 0 0 17.11% 0 0 17.73% 0 0 17.70% 2
file 7445748 0 0 15.63% 0 0 17.80% 0 0 17.04% 1
zlib cacf7f1d* 0 - 26.70% 0 - 27.38% 0 - 25.08% 0
zlib 7c2a874 0 0 26.56% 0 0 29.08% 0 0 24.45% 2
zlib 14763ac 0 0 31.44% 0 0 31.65% 0 0 32.12% 1
tiff2pdf d57ccfc9* 0 - 8.48% 0 - 8.37% 0 - 8.27% 0
tiff2pdf f64949a 0 0 8.42% 0 0 8.47% 0 0 8.47% 3
flac d2cb0d1* 0 - 12.48% 0 - 12.16% 0 - 13.77% 0
flac d8d1717 0 0 12.29% 0 0 12.11% 1 1 14.23% 5
resulting states did not differ in a manner which would have a
significant impact on future branches. We deem such states as
semantically similar.
1) State Forking in Avoidable Code: One class of functions
which fit this category, and commonly produce semantically
similar states, are those related to the formatting and printing
of data for output. For example, uclibc’s printf17, and
its called functions, contain branches which will produce new
states if the arguments to printf are symbolic. However,
the resulting states are semantically similar as they only
pertain to the printing of data. When analysing tcpdump,
the functionality related to the formatting and printing of data
is responsible for 61% of the states forked, while on libtiff
similar functionality was responsible for 10% of solver time.
Such state forking can be resolved by introducing a low
fidelity model of the functions in question. A low fidelity model
is a significantly less complex replacement function. In the case
of functions which only produce semantically similar states,
that model can effectively be an empty function body such as
that which we used for printf (shown in Listing 1). These
changes may of course impact soundness and completeness,
and so it is important to consider them on an application by
application basis.
Avoidable code that is responsible for significant state
forking also appears within the applications themselves. For
example, tcpdump makes use of libpcap to load packets
for processing. It can achieve this by making use of one of
17klee-uclibc/libc/stdio/printf.c
Listing 1. Low fidelity mode for printf.
1 int printf(const char * format, ...) {
↪→ return 0; }
Listing 2. fread in pcap.
1 amt_read = fread((char *)&magic, 1,
↪→ sizeof(magic), fp);
2 for (i = 0; i < N_FILE_TYPES; i++) {
3 p = (*check_headers[i])(...);
4 if (p != NULL)
5 goto found;
6 }
two different parsers, which effectively produce the same end
result, but one of which contains significantly fewer branches
on symbolic data than the other. Listing 2 shows the loop which
iterates over a list of function pointers, and calls each function
with the header from the input file. The function indicates that
it can load the data by returning a non-null value. If a null
value is returned the next function is consulted. Consequently,
we can force the less complex parser to be utilised by inserting
a single assumption, as shown in Listing 3 at line 1.
2) State Forking in Input-Discarding Code: Another com-
mon source of semantically similar states is code which
skips over input bytes while searching for some delimiter or
terminating character. Listing 4 gives an example from zlib,
Listing 3. check_headers in pcap.
1 klee_assume(magic == TCPDUMP_MAGIC);
2 if (magic != TCPDUMP_MAGIC && ...) {
3 return (NULL); /* nope */
4 }
Listing 4. A while loop with discarded data in zlib.
1 if ((flags & COMMENT) != 0) {
2 while ((c = get_byte(s)) != 0 && c
↪→ != EOF);
3 }
which is intended to read and discard a comment in the input.
Owing to the conditional statements, the number of states
quadruples on each loop iteration. In zlib, this construct is
responsible for 42% of forked states, while similar constructs
appear in several of the other targets; e.g. jasper (74%),
file (63%) and libjpeg (91%).
In each of these targets we resolved the issue via the insertion
of assumptions. The mitigation for the example shown in
Listing 4 can be seen in Listing 5. Assumptions can be seen
as guidance through the code by compromising theoretical
completeness (which is effectively impossible in practice) for
analysis in the more interesting areas of the code, as deemed
by a domain expert.
B. Resource Consumption by States on Error Paths
Often, once a path has reached a certain point, it will never
return to interesting code that we wish to analyse. Usually, this
arises when a state has reached an error path and the remainder
of its processing exclusively involves standard error handling.
In order to avoid analysing such uninteresting paths, we modify
the code of the highest function in the error handling chain to
immediately exit the program, which terminates the state.
Alternatively, in some situations, the error handling function
may only be invoked after expensive processing and it may be
preferable to add assumptions which ensure that no path can
enter the code that reaches an error state in the first place. The
downside of this approach is that each line of code that may
reach an error state must be individually handled. Listing 6
gives an example of a blocked path after the introduction of a
klee_assume statement.
Our mitigation poses risks as bugs may be present in the
uninteresting paths we have manually sliced out. However, the
alternative is fatal state space explosion. We reduced this risk
Listing 5. Avoiding forking via an assumption in zlib.
1 if ((flags & COMMENT) != 0) {
2 c = get_byte(s);
3 klee_assume(c == 0 | c == EOF);
4 while (c != 0 && c != EOF) ;
5 }
Listing 6. A call to TIFFErrorExt in LibTIFF.
1 klee_assume(tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips);
2 if (!tif->tif_dir.td_nstrips) {
3 TIFFErrorExt(...);
4 goto bad;
5 }
by verifying that the sliced out paths are simple and unlikely
to expose bugs.
C. Expensive Initialisation of Static Data
Code related to static instantiation of concrete data can often
be expensive due to the sheer number of instructions involved.
For example, libjpeg contains a function to instantiate an
array with static data. This function contains a number of
nested loops, that when unrolled amount to 19,791,892 LLVM
instructions. Essentially, the flattened loop encompasses 1.2x
more instructions than that executed by KLEE in a one hour run
for libjpeg. Furthermore, the function lies on a path which
all states must pass through in order to continue deeper into
the program. During our experimental runs, no paths managed
to break through the function.
A less extreme case was also encountered during the analysis
of tcpdump when it initialises a table for the calculation of
CRC values.
There are two ways to resolve issues such as these. In cases
like libjpeg, where the total number of instructions that must
be executed is excessively large, one can statically compute
the resulting table ahead-of-time and simply embed it in the
target software. This was the approach taken for libjpeg,
and code coverage increased from 13.18% to 19.18%. In cases
like tcpdump, where the number of instructions is sufficiently
small that a single state exercising them is not overly time
consuming, then the initialisation code can often be lifted to a
point in the program before any state forking has taken place.
D. Overhead of Initialisation Code
Some applications have distinct subcomponents which can
be more efficiently tested in isolation. For instance, w3m
contains a library called libwc, which is used for character
conversion. The library is accessed through a single API,
wc_Str_conv_with_detect, and it is invoked to convert
the stream of input characters prior to HTML parsing. The
input provided to w3m is directly passed to this API, with
no constraints imposed. Therefore, testing the safety of the
character conversion code entails the unnecessary overhead of
first analysing the extensive initialisation routines which w3m
goes through prior to reaching the interesting API.
To avoid this, a driver program can be constructed which
calls the API function of interest. In the case of w3m, this is
also a convenient way to solve another problem. Depending
on the locale information for the machine on which w3m
is running, and the values of the initial bytes of input,
wc_Str_conv_with_detect will invoke the appropriate
conversion function. Crucially, since the locale is fixed for a
given analysis machine and not treated as symbolic by KLEE,
only a limited subset of the conversion functions is available to
be invoked, and therefore tested. In the driver program, shown
in Listing 7 we can simply mark the locale (given by the hint
variable) as symbolic and KLEE will discover and test all the
available conversion functions.
Listing 7. libwc driver program.
1 from = WC_CES_UTF_8;
2 klee_make_symbolic(&hint, sizeof(
↪→ wc_ces), "hint");
3 klee_assume(hint == WC_CES_US_ASCII
↪→ || hint == ...);
4 to = WC_CES_UTF_8;
5 s = wc_Str_conv_with_detect(s, &
↪→ from, hint, to);
E. Inability to Reason about Meta-Properties of Input
Symbolic execution engines generally track the propagation
of symbolic data via direct data-flow; e.g. if a is symbolic and
b = a + 10, then the engine will represent b as a symbolic
value derived from a and 10 via the addition operator. However,
applications often make decisions based on meta-properties
of input data (e.g. string length), and these meta-properties
usually do not have a direct data-flow dependency or transition
on the input data. Therefore, the engine is unable to track
and reason about the relationship between the input data and
meta-properties.
a) tcpdump out-of-bounds memory access.: When pro-
cessing an input file, libpcap reads an integer from the file,
bounds its value to the range (0, 262144) and then allocates
a buffer based on the value. When KLEE detects a symbolic
value being passed to malloc, it concretises that value through
a solver query.
Later, in tcpdump, a number of security-relevant bugs arise
when certain sequences of code are triggered which increment a
pointer beyond the end of a buffer. Whether they are detectable
or not depends on what allocation size KLEE previously
produced during concretisation. The impact of concretisation
is significant; a small value (e.g. 6) results in 4 bugs being
found, a very large value (e.g. 262144) results in 3 bugs, while
a value of 128 results in 32 bugs.
A general solution to this problem would require adding
functionality to KLEE to support dynamically allocated memory
regions with variable bounds. In our case we handled it by
detecting when concretisation occurred, inspecting the code
which makes use of the produced buffer and adding assumptions
on the concretisation size to ensure it is within a sensible range
e.g. for tcpdump we added a constraint to bound the allocated
buffer’s size to the range (128, 256).
b) zlib out-of-bounds memory access.: In zlib, the
root cause of why KLEE fails to detect CVE-2005-2096
is similarly due to its inability to track and reason about a
metaproperty of input. A key variable in triggering the bug
is min, the value of which is calculated as shown in Listing
8. Even though an attacker can control the value of min by
Listing 9. Code snippet of memcpy.
1 void *memcpy(void * s1, const void *
↪→ s2, size_t n) {
2 char *r1 = s1;
3 const char *r2 = s2;
4 while (n) {
5 *r1++ = *r2++;
6 --n;
7 }
8 return s1;
9 }
controlling the values found within the count array, there
is no direct data-flow dependency between them and thus
KLEE cannot reason about any conditions which are based on
the value of min. Essentially, min is not considered symbolic.
Listing 8. Metaproperty calculation in inflate_table.
1 for (min = 1; min <= MAXBITS; min
↪→ ++)
2 if (count[min] != 0) break;
Such a case is synonymous to a bug that is triggered
according to the length of a symbolic string, rather than
the strings actual content. There is no direct way to deal
with this issue without extensive modifications to the analysis
engine. Instead, we hope that by alleviating the other problems
mentioned, we enable a sufficient increase in the number
of processed paths where one with the desired property is
produced and scheduled.
F. Inefficient Environment Models
Often, real-world programs interact with code provided by
the environment (e.g. the kernel and third-party libraries). For
such code, the analysis engine has the choice of evaluating it
as if it were code within the target application, or skipping
over the call and mimicking its effects via a model. The former
approach is more straightforward, as an accurate model can
be difficult to construct. However, we encountered several
situations in which analysing the environment-provided code
resulted in critical state-space explosion.
For instance, the memcpy functionality provided by
uclibc is shown in Listing 9. State space explosion growth
occurs when n is symbolic as the while loop will potentially
create 2n states on each memcpy call. KLEE also performs
queries at three different locations on each iteration of the loop:
(1) to check the value of n at the head of the loop, (2) to check
that the dereference of r1 is in bounds, and (3) to check that
the dereference of r2 is in bounds. During an analysis run of
tcpdump, the while loop was responsible for 50% of the states
produced, and 25% of the solver queries issued.
The memset and strtol family of functions have similar
issues. A direct mitigation to this problem is to add handlers
to KLEE for such functions, which model their effects without
invoking the native code. We were able to alleviate the issues
in some situations by adding assumptions which limited the
bounds of symbolic variables or concretised them outright.
V. EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF MANUAL
INTERVENTION
We took an iterative approach when introducing our modifi-
cations, as detailed in Section IV, and stopped the mitigation
process when there was no longer a clear and significant
challenge that we can address using manual intervention. As
manually mitigating the issues is quite time consuming, for each
program we focused on two versions: the head, as provided
by version control at the start of our evaluation, and one other
version found in Hemiptera.
Table III shows the results obtained by running KLEE on
the target applications, using manual intervention to alleviate
issues, as described in Section IV.
A. Results
a) Code Coverage: Our modifications resulted in in-
creased coverage in every analysed program, except one
version of tiff2pdf. The most significant improvements
in percentage points (pp) were in zlib-7c2a874 (+7.27),
libjpeg-3091354 (+6.45) and tcpdump-a9e4211
(+5.12). The average increase in coverage across all applications
and versions was 3.08 percentage points.
Regarding tiff2pdf: despite our attempts, KLEE still
struggled to get beyond the initial portion of the parser. The
parser contains a large number of loops with branches based on
symbolic data and there was no clear set of logical assumptions
which would help KLEE progress. The reason for the drop in
code coverage is that the added assumptions, which aim to
eliminate paths that appear superfluous, e.g. error paths, did
not result in a corresponding increase in coverage elsewhere.
b) Bugs Found: Without manual intervention, KLEE
found bugs in six of the program versions analysed. With
manual intervention, bugs were found in three new programs,
namely file, zlib and flac. Within the six program
versions where bugs were discovered with manual intervention,
the modifications resulted in a increase in the number of bugs
found.
The most significant improvement was in tcpdump with
29 new bugs discovered. At the time of analysis, these bugs
were still present in the release version. Notable interventions
responsible for the increase in bug count in tcpdump include:
(1) the adding of assumptions to avoid KLEE concretising
integers to zero that later were used to control allocation sizes,
and (2) the replacement of libc’s printf with a low fidelity
function
The number of bugs found, and their diversity, also in-
creased significantly on w3m-02ba3d6, from 4 bugs across
2 conversion functions to 24 bugs across 10 conversion
functions. The most significant change for w3m was the use
of a driver program, which enabled the direct analysis of
compartmentalized libraries without the need to go through
HTML parsing code.
c) Required Effort: Scientifically quantifying manual
effort is always going to be a tricky endeavour. It depends
on numerous variables where their measurements are often
subjective, e.g. the skill of the manual analysts and the com-
plexity of the application. Nevertheless, the time required for
indentifying and making the changes was a matter of minutes,
i.e. less that 15 minutes. In total we spent approximately two
days per target (16 hours), which includes the analysis time
taken by KLEE.
We conclude that the above data validates the assumption
that manual intervention can alleviate a variety of issues
encountered when analysing real world programs.
B. Limitations
Manual intervention resulted in an increase in code coverage
across most targets, and an increase in bugs found across almost
half of the targets. However, the number of bugs found did not
increase for 10 of the 18 targets on which we applied manual
intervention. Despite increasing code coverage for many of
these 10 targets we were still not alleviating a sufficient number
of problems encountered by KLEE.
Manual intervention appears to hit diminishing returns after
a few iterations of our process. In general, we observed that at
first there are a very small number of problematic constructs
that when addressed result in significant gains. Over time state
forking and solver query time (which are usually the limiting
factors) become more evenly distributed across the covered
code and it becomes more difficult to determine what paths
can be eliminated, and which ones should be kept. The cost of
discovering the correct assumptions increases, and the pay-off,
in terms of additional code coverage, decreases.
To give a concrete example: after 7 iterations of changes and
analysis on file, 46% of all forks were distributed across its
parse function. It is a complex function through which all
states must pass, and thus it could not be replaced with a low
fidelity model. As no paths were obviously uninteresting we
also could not utilise assumptions to remove them.
Predicting the impact and validity of a change can also
be quite difficult. On a number of occasions, we added an
assumption only to discover at runtime that it was incompatible
with an assumption added elsewhere, or conditions imposed
by the source code itself.
For instance, Listing 10 is a code-snippet taken from w3m,
where line 3 is responsible for a large number of forks (45%).
The first attempt made to alleviate this issue involved the
addition of the klee_assume shown on line 2. However, the
assumption is invalid, as states which reach this code have
passed through functions that guarantee that the string is NULL
terminated. Such a mistake was only realised during runtime
as KLEE printed a warning regarding the logical inconsistency.
Listing 10. An insertion of an invalid assumption for w3m.
1 for (i = 0; i < s->length; i++) {
2 klee_assume(s->ptr[i] != ’\0’);
3 if (s->ptr[i] == ’\0’) {...}
TABLE III
COVERAGE AND BUG COUNT WHEN RUNNING KLEE ON MODIFIED PROGRAMS
Program Commit
Default State
of the Art
With modifications
Bugs H. Bugs ICov
Bugs H. Bugs ICov (%) Mean ∆ Mean ∆ ICov (%) ∆ (pp)
libjpeg-turbo a0b7de9* 0 - 23.1 0 0 - - 27.08 +3.98
libjpeg-turbo 3091354 1 0 15.01 1 0 0 0 21.46 +6.45
imginfo 4212e7e* 0 - 10.36 0 0 - - 14.22 +3.86
imginfo b702259 1 1 10.39 2 +1 2 +1 11.3 +0.91
file df74b09* 0 - 12.61 0 0 - - 16.62 +4.01
file b6e8437 0 0 13.83 1 +1 1 +1 16.25 +2.42
tcpdump 17a3c288* 32 - 4.94 61 +29 - - 8.89 +3.95
tcpdump a9e4211 40 2 4.91 69 +29 3 +1 10.03 +5.12
zlib cacf7f1d* 0 - 26.7 0 0 - - 30.66 +3.96
zlib 7c2a874 0 0 26.56 1 +1 1 +1 33.83 +7.27
tiff2pdf d57ccfc9* 0 - 8.48 0 0 - - 7.68 -0.80
tiff2pdf f64949a 0 0 8.42 0 0 0 0 9.17 +0.75
flac d2cb0d1* 0 - 12.48 0 0 - - 17.3 +4.82
flac d8d1717 0 0 12.29 1 +1 1 +1 17.3 +5.01
w3m 1ac245b* 0 - 9.01 0 0 - - 9.43 +0.42
w3m 02ba3d6 4 0 9.07 5 +1 0 0 9.13 +0.06
w3m-driver 1ac245b* 0 - 9.01 0 0 - - 10.13 +1.12
w3m-driver 02ba3d6 4 0 9.07 24 +20 1 +1 11.13 +2.06
Average change +3.08
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
a) Analysis Validity.: The key threat to validity concerns
the quality of our modifications, which are derived manually.
Whilst we were cautious, a priori knowledge of the bugs present
in Hemiptera could have indirectly influenced us during our
experiments. We reduced this threat in two ways. Firstly, apart
from buggy commits, we also experimented with the head
versions of the programs where no bugs were known. Secondly,
modifications are justified according to concrete evidence; they
are strictly included only if they address issues that are apparent
in the data collected from experimental runs.
It is possible that different symbolic execution engines would
have presented different challenges that were not apparent
within KLEE. We primarily selected KLEE as it is seen as the
state-of-the-art and has been employed extensively in previous
work [6], [21], [22], [10].
b) Validity of Hemiptera.: A concern associated with
internal validity of Hemiptera is the potential for false
positives in the bugs included. We minimised this threat
by triggering all bugs to confirm their presence. Another
potential concern is biases in the selection process. Although
completeness (i.e. recording all previous bugs in an application)
was never our objective, we did strive to consider the majority
of bugs in a practical manner so that such biases may be
reduced.
Another potential threat is the generalisability of
Hemiptera with respect to other applications. We address
this concern by considering a reasonably high number of bugs
across a diverse set of applications.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we give an account on previous works aimed
at making symbolic execution more effective for bug finding.
We also give a short review on previously proposed bug datasets,
and contrast them to Hemiptera.
A. Symbolic Execution
There is a substantial amount of research that has sought to al-
leviate the limitations of path-based symbolic execution. Many
of these approaches involve applying symbolic execution on
fragments of the target applications. For instance, ZESTI [21]
uses KLEE to analyse program paths, exercised by regression
tests, against all possible inputs, while UC-KLEE [22] is an
extension of KLEE capable of analysing arbitrary function code
with under-constrained symbolic input.
State pruning [4] has been employed to remove redundant
states. For instance, AEG [1] only considers states that satisfy
a given precondition, whilst Yi et al. [33] propose pruning off
states that have their path conditions subsumed by previous
exploration. FIE [11] uses state pruning to scale symbolic
execution for bug discovery in firmware programs. It also
makes loop counters symbolic in order to limit the number of
states forked at looping constructs.
Concolic execution has been successful in avoiding some
of the issues of symbolic execution when applied to whole
applications [7], [28], [14]. It is of interest to assess manual
intervention done within the context of concolic exection,
but such an endeavour would warrant a full study on its
own. Mayhem [7] takes a hybrid approach; it begins with
symbolic execution, with forking enabled, but switches to
concolic execution once a threshold is reached in order to avoid
excessive memory consumption. Moreover, in both concolic
and symbolic execution, there has also been research aimed
at automatically resolving state space explosion due to loops
and frequently called functions. Christakis et al. [20] make
use of summarisation to verify the memory safety of the ANI
Windows Image Parser. A number of researchers have presented
systems that make use of state merging [2], [18].
As detailed in Section IV-E, indirect data flows pose
challenges to tracking symbolic variables. Corin et al. [9]
employ control-flow analysis techniques to mitigate this. In
relation to the challenge in Section IV-B, Rawat et al. [23]
propose heuristics to automatically identify error paths to avoid
their consideration.
We expect that many of the mitigations we have documented,
and manual intervention in general, would be beneficial in
allowing the above tools to gain increased code coverage
and bug finding capabilities, but this remains to be evaluated
empirically.
B. Bug Datasets
One of the earliest works related to bug datasets was carried
out by Wilander et al. [32]. The authors manually developed 44
C function calls to evaluate tools designed for static intrusion
prevention. Zitser et al. [34] presented a dataset comprised
of 14 bugs based on exploitable buffer overflows found in
three open-source applications. The bugs were extracted and
transformed into smaller program models to enable tools, which
suffer from scalability issues, to be evaluated. Kretkiewicz et al.
[15] built upon the work of Zitser et al. by proposing a greater
number of test cases (as opposed to just 14). A similar approach
was taken by Ku et al. [16], where their dataset consists of 298
generated test cases (half of which are faulty) derived from
22 bug kernels. Overall, these datasets have one underlying
issue; their test cases are all synthetic. Threats to external
generalisability arise as they fail to capture significantly the
complexities of real-world software.
BugBench [19] was one of the first notable bug dataset to
consider entire real-world applications, rather than bug kernels.
Unfortunately, the main limiting factor of BugBench is its
relatively low bug count (19 bugs in total), which hinders its
diversity. BegBunch [8] was later released. Its test cases were
generated by making use of bug kernels extracted from real-
world software, similar to the approach taken by Zitser et al.
[34]. However, a greater number of kernels were used, namely
64. In total, their relevant corpus includes 181 synthetic test
cases.
The Juliet Test Suite [3] is a large collection of 81,056
synthetic C/C++ and Java programs provided by NIST Soft-
ware Assurance Metrics and Tool Evaluation (SAMATE). All
together, the test cases encompass 118 different CWEs. Fur-
thermore, Shiraishi et al. [25] present a corpus of 1,276 simple
synthetic programs that encapsulate common characteristics of
automotive software. Only half of the test cases contain flaws.
More recently, Dolan-Gavitt et al. [13] proposed LAVA, a
technique that automatically injects vulnerabilities into source
code. The authors made use of their tool to inject vulnerabilities
into four real-world applications; for example, LAVA inserted
1064 bugs in the readelf application. Although LAVA
facilitates the construction of a large bug corpus, there is
no guarantee that the injected flaws are representative of issues
that occur in real world code.
The DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge [26], [27] provided a set
of challenges comprised of 131 vulnerable binaries, constructed
for the competition. They are designed to run on DECREE, a
custom operating system which supports a limited number of
system calls and was also specifically created for the challenge.
As with the other synthetic corpora, it is not clear how well
the programs, their vulnerabilities and execution environment
correspond with real software.
Hemiptera has more real bugs than any other benchmark
to date. Although it still faces threats related to generalisability,
a researcher should have a higher degree of confidence when
using Hemiptera, as results correlate with a large number of
real-world bugs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present Hemiptera, a novel bug suite,
and use it to investigate the issues faced by KLEE, a state of
the art symbolic execution engine, when analysing real-world
software. We document an in-depth analysis of the issues that
hinder KLEE and categorise the main challenges faced. While
KLEE is capable of finding bugs on some of the targets in
Hemiptera, our evaluation highlights the fact that a number
of commonly occurring code constructs can severely hinder its
progress.
We utilised the above categorisation to experimentally
evaluate the effectiveness and limitations of manual intervention
in symbolic execution. Whilst the approach is not without its
issues, our experience shows an improvement in both bugs
found and code coverage. According to these results, we
conclude that manual intervention is likely to be a rewarding
effort in the real world deployment of symbolic execution tools.
We believe that the analysis of the issues found should also
prove useful for future work on automated solutions, and that
Hemiptera will be a valuable resource in evaluating such
solutions.
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